

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00341 01 OF 03 151114Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
ACDE-00 /078 W

-----071820 151124Z /12

O 151020Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2950
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0341

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER MBFR MISSIONS ROUTINE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC ON THE
NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00341 01 OF 03 151114Z

REF: MBFR VIENNA 330 DTG 101123 JUN 78 (NOTAL)

THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS FORWARDED REFTEL AS
FURTHER REVISED AND APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP ON JUNE 14
FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE NAC: BEGIN TEXT:

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS

1. THIS PAPER IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, 1978. IT IS BASED ON THE EASTERN TEXT AND EASTERN CLARIFICATIONS PROVIDED THROUGH THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 13. IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE THE AD HOC GROUP CAN PROVIDE AN OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS BECAUSE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS ARE STILL NOT CLEAR.

2. THE ANNEX OF THIS PAPER CONTAINS FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS MADE AVAILABLE IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 13. IT SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH SECTION II OF THE AD HOC GROUP'S REPORT OF JUNE 9.

A. GENERAL

3. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE THE FIRST MOVE BY THE EAST OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE IN RELATION TO ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE WEST SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. HOWEVER, THESE PROPOSALS MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO MEET THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN CONCERN ON MANPOWER DISPARITIES. THEY ARE PREDICATED ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE DATA ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER TABLED BY THE EAST. THEY THEREFORE PROVIDE NO INDICATION THAT THE EAST IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00341 01 OF 03 151114Z

THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT AN MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD ELIMINATE THE PACT'S LARGE MANPOWER SUPERIORITY. THUS, THESE PROPOSALS INCREASE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATA PROBLEM AS THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

B. ISSUES ON WHICH THE EASTERN POSITION HAS CHANGED

5. THE EAST HAS DROPPED ITS REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER AND HAS THUS ACCEPTED THAT THE FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ON GROUND FORCES. IT HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT A COMMON CEILING BE PLACED ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

6. THE EAST HAS FORMALLY ACCEPTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN OUTCOME OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY ON EACH SIDE FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THROUGH REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE COMPUTED AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF EACH SIDE AND A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT 700,000 MEN. THIS MEANS THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT FOR CALCULATING MANPOWER REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE WEST. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IS OF LITTLE PRACTICAL VALUE AT PRESENT BECAUSE THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE PREDICATED ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF EASTERN TABLED DATA WHICH

THE WEST REJECTS.

7. THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED FOR PHASE I THE CONCEPT OF
REDUCTION OF SELECTED AND DIFFERENT ARMAMENTS FOR THE US AND
USSR RATHER THAN EQUAL REDUCTION OF THE SAME ARMAMENTS ON
EITHER SIDE.

8. THE EAST HAS NOW OFFERED TO WITHDRAW IN PHASE I 1,000
SOVIET TANKS INSTEAD OF THE 1,700 TANK WITHDRAWAL PROPOSED BY
THE WEST. IT IS ALSO OFFERING TO WITHDRAW 250 MECHANIZED
INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES BUT NOT TO LIMIT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL.
BUT, IN RETURN, IT IS REQUIRING THAT THE WEST WITHDRAW ALL THE
ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER OF DECEMBER 1975. AS
REGARDS ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, THE EAST HAS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00341 01 OF 03 151114Z

MADE CLEAR THAT IT CONTINUES TO SEEK

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00341 02 OF 03 151121Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00
ICAE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
ACDE-00 /078 W

-----072045 151125Z /10

O R 151020Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2951
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERNIN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0341

ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BY EACH OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE EAST HAS INTRODUCED A NEW PROVISION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE USSR OR THE US TO WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY FROM THEIR PHASE I COMMITMENTS IF EITHER WAS NOT SATISFIED THAT NON-US AND NON-SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II CONFORMED TO THE PATTERN OF US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS BY UNITS AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. OF COURSE, EXERCISE OF THIS PROVISION WOULD NULLIFY THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING PHASE I US WITHDRAWALS, AND THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THIS CONSEQUENCE INTO ACCOUNT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00341 02 OF 03 151121Z

9. THE EAST IS OFFERING THAT PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD BE COMPUTED BY TAKING AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF EACH OF THESE FORCES, I.E., A 2:1 RATIO OF SOVIET TO US MANPOWER WITHDRAWALS IN THAT PHASE. THIS IS THE SAME CONCEPTUAL BASIS ON WHICH THE WEST ORIGINALLY COMPUTED ITS PROPOSALS FOR PHASE I US-SOVIET WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, THE REDUCTION PROPOSED BY THE EAST IS 7 PERCENT BASED ON EASTERN DATA, AND NOT THE 15 PERCENT BASED ON WESTERN DATA SOUGHT BY THE WEST. MOREOVER, THIS FEATURE DOES NOT ALTER THE OVERALL REDUCTION OUTCOME PROPOSED BY THE EAST.

10. THE EAST HAS ALSO ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THAT AGREED MANPOWER CEILINGS SHOULD BE OF A COLLECTIVE NATURE, AND IT APPEARS TO HAVE DROPPED ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN NATIONAL CEILINGS AT POST REDUCTION LEVELS. HOWEVER, UPPER LIMITS ON NATIONAL MANPOWER LEVELS REMAIN PART OF THE EASTERN SCHEME UNDER THE PROCEDURE STATED IN PARA 8 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE EAST ALSO CONTINUES TO INSIST ON NATIONAL MANPOWER REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BY APPROXIMATELY EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BY EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHIN EACH SIDE. THE NEW PROPOSALS REJECTED THE WESTERN APPROACH THAT US AND SOVIET MANPOWER ALONE BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL THROUGH SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS. INSTEAD, THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE THAT THE USSR AND THE USA WOULD BE SUBJECT ONLY TO THE SAME ARRANGEMENT FOR SUCH UPPER LIMITS OF NATIONAL MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE AREA AS OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

11. THE EAST HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WOULD INCLUDE TWO FULL DIVISIONS INSTEAD OF THE FIVE FULL DIVISIONS REQUIRED IN THE WESTERN INITIATIVE.

12. THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF REDUC-

TIONS BE SPLIT INTO TWO SUCCESSIVE STAGES BROADLY ON THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00341 02 OF 03 151121Z

LINES PROPOSED AS AN ALTERNATIVE IN THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE.

C. NEW ISSUES RAISED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSALS

13. WHILE AGREEING TO THE WESTERN VIEW THT NO POST-REDUCTION
RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE LOCATION OF MILITARY FORMA-
TIONS IN THE REDUCTION AREA, THE EAST HAS EXPLICITLY PROPOSED
LIMITS FOR BOTH SIDES ON FORMATIONS AND UNITS SUBJECT TO
REDUCTIONS. THESE LIMITS SEEM TO BE ON A NATIONAL BASIS.

14. THE EAST IS REQUESTING A FREEZE ON THE NUMBER OF
MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACETIME FOR
EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00341 03 OF 03 151129Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
ACDE-00 /078 W

-----072263 151131Z /10

O 151020Z JUN 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2952

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0341

FROM US REP MBFR USSALTTWO

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER MBFR MISSIONS ROUTINE

D. ADDITIONAL POINTS

15. THE EAST HAS STATED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN POSITION NOT DEALT WITH IN THE NEW PROPOSALS REMAIN AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED.

16. THE EAST CONTINUES TO TREAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00341 03 OF 03 151129Z

ALIKE, AS REGARDS REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, MANPOWER CEILINGS, THE NEED TO UNDERTAKE ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, AND THE FORM OF REDUCTIONS (THAT IS, BY UNITS), REGARDLESS OF GEOGRAPHY AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF PARTICIPANTS WITH THEIR TERRITORY IN THE AREA AND THOS LOCATED OUTSIDE IT.

ANNEX 1

SUMMARY OF POINTS ON NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS MADE IN
INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 13

1. THE EAST EXPECTS NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II.

2. THE EAST CONSIDERS THAT THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FIGURES NOW ON THE TABLE WOULD HAVE TO BE UPDATED PRIOR TO AN AGREEMENT.

3. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A 900,000 OVERALL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER CEILING AND 700,000 CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER APPARENTLY ENVISAGED A SEPARATE CEILING OF 200,000 FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER, RATHER THAN A LIMIT WHICH COULD INCREASE ABOVE 200,000 IF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DROPPED BELOW 700,000 AS PROVIDED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THIS AIR FORCE MANPOWER CEILING WOULD BE COLLECTIVE.

4. IN THE EASTERN VIEW, ASIDE FROM THE THREE SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMAMENTS OF US UNITS TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE I WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DECISION BY US AUTHORITIES. SOVIET AUTHORITIES COULD DECIDE THE SAME IN RESPECT TO THE ARMAMENTS OF SOVIET FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN ASIDE FROM MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES.

5. IT REMAINS UNCLEAR AS TO WHAT THE EAST MEANS IN SAYING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00341 03 OF 03 151129Z

THAT THE PATTERN OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PATTERN OF US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I OTHER THAN THAT THE EAST HAS IN MIND REDUCTION BY UNITS AND A "PACKAGE" OF SPECIFIC ARMAMENTS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO THE "PACKAGE" NOW BEING PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR PHASE I US AND SOVIET ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. THE EAST HAS DECLINED TO SPECIFY ITS VIEWS ON THE CONTENT OF SUCH A "PACKAGE" FOR PHASE II.

6. THE EAST HAS CONFIRMED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE TO REACH A PHASE II AGREEMENT ON THE PATTERN OF REDUCTIONS, EITHER THE US OR USSR COULD UNILATERALLY NULLIFY THE ENTIRE PHASE I AGREEMENT INCLUDING PHASE I REDUCTIONS, RETURNING THE SITUATION TO THE STARTING POINT, IF THE PATTERN OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY NON-US AND NON-SOVIET DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT CONFORM TO THE PHASE I "PATTERN".

7. THE EAST HAS ADMITTED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS PROPOSED ON THE MEMBERS OF EACH ALLIANCE AS REGARDS THEIR CAPACITY TO COMPENSATE FOR UNILATERAL POST-REDUCTION REDUCTIONS BY ONE OF THEIR ALLIES COULD THEORETICALLY RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE A GIVEN SIDE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RESTORE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ITS FORCES TO THE PERMITTED LEVEL. END TEXT.RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00341
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780250-0184
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780656/aaaabwgq.tel
Line Count: 361
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 3c966088-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 MBFR VIENNA 330
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2340561
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC ON THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS SECRET
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3c966088-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014